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Abstract: 
 
ZANGRILLO, IAN B. The Effects of Oil Price Shocks on the Stock Market Returns in 
Developed Economies, March 2017.  
 
 
 This paper examines the effects of oil price shocks on stock returns in OECD countries, 
specifically Canada, France, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, United States, and Norway. The 
empirical method used is the vector autoregression (VAR) model where a generalized impulse 
response function is applied to the results of the VAR to determine how stock prices respond to a 
shock in oil prices. The VAR model uses quarterly data for the period 1994 to 2016 for the 
following variables: interest rates, real GDP, real stock returns, real UK Brent crude oil, and 
APSP crude oil index. To take into account structural changes and different geo-political and 
economic events within the data, the whole sample is divided into multiple sub-groups. The 
results suggest no relationship between oil price shocks and stock returns in developed countries 
when taking into account the full sample period. When the sample is segregated the results 
illustrate a negative relationship of oil price shocks to stock returns in the second sub-group 
(2003, Q1 – 2008, Q3) for France and a positive relationship in Canada in the third sub-group 
representing the time period of 2008, Q4 to 2012, Q2.  The results suggest the necessity to 
segregate the data in order to take into account structural changes across time and present little 
evidence for fluctuations of oil prices influencing stock returns.  
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Chapter One 
I. Introduction 
 
 Oil represents one of the main inputs of production for industrialized nations, as the 
majority of the world’s production requires the use of oil, especially in manufacturing and 
transportation. Since oil is a major factor of production, it is assumed that a significant change in 
oil prices will have an effect on input prices, therefore influencing profitability of firms and its 
share price. Because of the proposed effect on the global economy, several studies have been 
done to quantify the relationship, if any, between stock markets and oil price shocks. This paper 
looks at eight countries in the OECD to determine the effects of oil price shocks on stock returns. 
Additionally, it looks at whether the effects differ depending on whether the country is an oil 
producer or consumer. Due to the importance of studying this relationship, OPEC and other large 
oil producing countries have been looked at closely to gage its level of production because of its 
large effect on the determination of oil prices.   
The oil price declines in 2016 have caused much controversy on how oil producers 
should react. OPEC had a meeting on November 30th 2016 to discuss its plan on whether to 
increase, decrease, or keep its production constant. OPEC stated that they plan to cut production 
in order to obtain a sustained increase in oil prices yet whether non-OPEC countries will follow 
is unknown. As of December 2016, Russia has arranged with OPEC to cut production yet other 
countries like Mexico and Norway publically stated that they would not join in reducing the 
production of oil. Even with OPEC projections to cut production to increase the price, in the 
recent Oil & Money conference there was a consensus that the increase in oil prices would be 
offset because of the recent decrease in costs in America’s shale fields (Smith & Blas 2016).  
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 The recent OPEC agreement to cut production by as much as 700,000 barrels a day has 
also affected the futures market. This agreement has caused many hedge funds to change their 
views on the upcoming oil market and bet bullish that the price of crude oil will rise in the 
future; crude oil futures has been its highest since July 2014. This bullish sentiment has not only 
affected options but has also trickled down into individual stocks related to oil (Banerji 2016).  
 Countries who are deeply reliant on the production and exportation of oil could see large 
effects on its economy as oil price fluctuate. If the majority of a country’s revenue and GDP is 
determined by the price of oil, then an oil shock (i.e. decrease in oil prices) could be a huge 
problem for oil producers. However, for countries that are highly diversified (i.e. the United 
States), oil price shocks may not pose such a huge threat. For instance, Saudi Arabia represents 
an oil-based economy. According to Forbes, petroleum accounts for 90% of exports earnings and 
45% of GDP as seen in Exhibit 1. Thus, oil-producing counties whose revenue relies deeply on 
oil exports may need to diversify their assets.  
Exhibit 1: Composition of Saudi Arabia GDP  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
**Source:	James	–	MEED		
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Historically, oil prices have been influenced deeply by political actions and consumer 
demand. By looking at the history of oil prices one can start to comprehend how oil price shocks 
were caused and illustrate the cause of the shocks in a simple supply and demand model.  Exhibit 
2 plots a graph of the Dow Jones versus WTI crude oil over a period of time, it suggests a 
possible association between the stock market and oil prices. During times of low oil prices, the 
stock market in the United States tends to do well, yet as time progresses the relationship 
changes to a positive correlation where stock prices follow the prices of oil.  
 
Exhibit 2:  
 
 
 
 
 
  
      
       **Source: Patton 
 
Exhibit 3 represents the WTI crude oil prices per barrel adjusted for inflation using the 
headline CPI on a logarithmic scale. During 1994, Q1 to 2016, Q1 there were eight oil price 
shocks (1974, 1979-1980, 1985, 1990-1991, 197-1998, 2001, 2003, 2014) caused by changes in 
the supply and demand of oil. A shock can be described as an unexpected event that produces a 
significant change in a short period. To summarize these shocks, it can be seen that as time 
progressed the source of oil price shocks shift. From the periods of 1974-1991, supply side 
factors are the reasons for a shock in oil prices. After 1991, shifts in the demand of oil are more 
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influential. It can be seen that around 1986 the pattern of oil prices seems to change. Pre-1986, 
oil prices were very steady except for a sudden increase or decrease whereas post-1986, oil 
prices seem to be more volatile and gradual.  
A supply and demand model can help us understand these changes in oil prices. During 
certain periods (1974, 1979-1980, 1985, 1990-1991, 2003), supply side factors were the main 
drivers, while during other periods (1997-1998, 2001), demand side factors were more prominent 
in causing shocks in oil prices. There are also certain periods (2014) where both supply and 
demand side factors cause a shock in oil prices. Political pressures, wars, and recessions are 
actions that can cause a shift in the supply or demand of oil. Changes in political pressures can 
cause shifts in the supply and demand of oil that consequently change the international price. For 
example, the model states that when there is a positive supply shock in the market, the supply 
curve shifts to the right causing the price of oil to decrease and the output to increase.   
 
Exhibit 3: Historical Crude Oil Prices   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://www.macrotrends.net/1369/crude-oil-price-history-chart 
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The first shock to the oil market occurred in 1974. In 1973, Arab oil producers imposed 
an embargo on oil exports. As a result of the imposed embargo by the highest oil producing 
countries, the supply of oil decreased immensely causing a negative supply shock. The oil crisis 
caused by the Arab oil producers leveraging their power over the global price of oil hit the 
western financial systems greatly, specifically the United States. In 1974, it was very difficult for 
the United States to respond to the embargo since the US industry at that time lacked the 
capacity to produce (Corbett). The decrease in the supply of oil caused the supply curve to shift 
left, resulting in a shortage.  As a result, the price of oil increased from $19.52 to $52.68 per 
barrel, as seen in Exhibit 4. 
Exhibit 4: Decrease in Supply of Oil   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1979-1980 represented the second major oil crisis. The second major oil crisis was very 
similar to the shock in 1974 due to its relation with the Middle East. In 1978, there was a 
revolution in Iran causing a supply disruption in the production of oil. The decrease in 
production of oil by a major oil producer provoked fear of an immense increase in oil prices 
similar to the 1974 oil crisis. Due to the fear, many countries decided to store oil and increase 
reserves, causing a negative supply shock (increase in oil prices). As seen in the model illustrated 
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for the 1974 shock, a decrease in supply will cause the supply curve to shift left and prices to 
increase (Graefe).  
In 1985, oil prices plummeted when Saudi Arabia decided to increase its market share in 
the production of oil, no longer abiding by OPEC output restrictions. In response to Saudi 
Arabia’s increase in market share, other OPEC members decided to increase production to stop 
reductions in their revenue. As seen in Exhibit 5, this increase in oil supply caused oil prices to 
decrease. Saudi Arabia was able to sustain the massive drop in the price of crude oil because of 
its large amount of oil reserves, one of the largest in OPEC. As seen in 1974, political pressures 
and actions play a large role in price changes within the oil market especially when large oil 
producers decide to alter production.  
 
Exhibit 5: Increase in Supply 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 1990 there was a short-term shock in the oil market where the price of crude oil 
increased immensely. The sharp increase in oil was caused by a war between Iraq and Kuwait 
(the Gulf War), countries that represented the two biggest oil producers at the time. As a result of 
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the war, the UN decided to impose an embargo on both Iraq and Kuwait’s oil exports thus 
knocking out the two biggest oil producers. The result was very similar to the situation in 1974 
where there was a negative supply shock (oil price increase) caused by a war between oil-
producing nations yet the Gulf War lasted for a shorter duration.  
Again in 1997 and early 1998, there was overproduction of oil due to the belief that 
world consumption would stay at the same level as years before. In the mid 1990’s, the economy 
was in economic expansion and experienced an increased world demand for energy. As a result, 
oil production was increasing in order to keep up with the consumption and demand. However, 
in 1997 there was a financial crisis in Asia and a decrease in activity in Japan and Europe 
resulting in a reduction of demand and consumption of oil (Mabro). Due to the negative demand 
shock, the demand curve shifted left thereby decreasing both the price (from $36.85 to $16.84 
per barrel) and output of oil in the oil markets as seen in Exhibit 6.  
Exhibit 6: Decrease in the Demand of Oil  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although the demand of oil fell significantly, the production of oil still increased at a 
constant rate due to the false belief that consumption would stay steady. This resulted in a huge 
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decline in the price of crude oil in 1997 (IMF, 2000). Once the price reached a certain level 
where countries could no longer sustain gains in revenue, OPEC decided to decrease the 
production of oil in 1999. As a result, the supply curve shifted to the left and the price of crude 
oil rose.  
The price of oil decreased in 2001 due to the US economy going into a decline while 
OPEC and non-OPEC countries increased oil production. Due to the decrease in demand and 
increase in supply, the price of oil plummeted. OPEC tried to stop this price reduction by 
decreasing production. In 2003, the price of oil increased due to the invasion of Iraq by the 
United States. The invasion caused a decrease in the supply of oil in the Gulf state thus shifting 
the supply curve to the left and increasing the price of oil while decreasing the output of oil. As a 
result of increased tension in the Middle East, an increase in demand from China and Asian 
countries due to economic expansion, and the depreciation of US currency, oil prices increased 
until 2008, Q3 when there was a financial crisis (BBC, 2008).  
The drop of oil prices in 2014 was caused by both supply and demand side factors. Many 
countries that were experiencing economic expansion – including China, Russia, and India – 
started to experience a decrease in growth resulting in a decrease in the demand for oil. The 
decrease in the demand for oil caused the demand curve to shift to the left and the price to fall. 
Additionally, due to the high prices of oil, the US and Canada started to produce more oil –
through fracking, for example – thereby immensely decreasing the volume of its imported oil. 
Since prices were dropping, Saudi Arabia had two options: to keep the level of market share and 
stay steady with the current level of production or cut production as a way to send prices upward. 
Saudi Arabia decided that market share represented a better path in the long-term and kept the 
production of oil stable, causing oil prices to plummet (Lawler, 2014).  The market has been 
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oversupplied and prices have plummeted as a result, creating uncertainty in the market, which 
should be represented in the stock markets.  
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Chapter Two 
II. Economic Theory on how oil Price Shocks can Affect Stock Markets   
 
 Oil price shocks and volatility should have effects on national income and therefore be 
represented in the stock markets. This paper will use the aggregate supply and demand model to 
show the link between oil prices and the oil market. This section will then use economic theory 
as a way to show how changes in the oil market affect stock returns through a change in a firm’s 
profits.  
Following Blanchard, the aggregate supply curve represents the relationship between 
total outputs on the price level for a given period of time. The aggregate supply curve is formed 
through the use of wages and prices. The aggregate supply curve can be represented by the 
following equation, which is derived from the wage and price equation:  
 
 
 
The price level is derived by the unemployment rate and expected price level.  
represents the unemployment effects on wages as a result, the higher the output in a given labor 
force, the lower the unemployment rate. Oil prices will be explained by the variable “z”, 
therefore a large shift in oil prices will cause “z” to change thus increasing the price level. To 
summarize, the aggregate supply curve captures the effect of output on price level in the 
following manner: an increase in output will lead to a decrease in the unemployment rate causing 
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wages to increase and the price level to increase overall. Since an increase in output leads to an 
increase in price level, the supply curve is upward sloping.  
Changes in expected price, expected inflation, price shocks, and output gap are the four 
factors that can shift aggregate supply. Therefore, when a major oil producer decides to increase 
its production of oil, the market will become saturated resulting a drop in the “z” variable. Since 
there is an initial decrease in “z” then the aggregate supply curve will shift right causing the 
actual price level to fall.  
When there is a change in expected inflation, both firms and workers will want to be 
compensated for the effects. For example, if expected inflation rises then workers and firms 
would want wages and prices to increase as a way to compensate for the losses. Therefore, an 
increase in expected inflation shifts the aggregate supply curve to the left since every output 
level is associated with higher price levels (profits). Price shocks occur when firms raise prices to 
offset the demand for higher wages. Additionally, high demand for an increase in wages causes 
output to exceed the production capacity of the economy, leading to a persistent positive output 
gap. This gap will cause inflation to rise due to the increase in demand. Thus, with the increase 
in inflation the aggregate supply curve shifts left. Each of these cases shows a negative supply 
shock caused by an increase in prices, which result in a decrease in nation income, as seen in 
Exhibit 7.  
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Exhibit 7: Negative supply shock  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The aggregate demand curve represents the amounts of goods produced that consumers 
are willing to purchase at various price levels; it shows how the price level affects output. The 
aggregate demand curve is represented by the following equation:  
   Y= C+I+G+NX  
The above equation shows that change in autonomous consumption, investment, 
government spending, or net exports can shift national income and therefore aggregate demand. 
The wealth effect and net exports effect can be used to explain shifts in the slope of the aggregate 
demand curve. The wealth effect states that as the price of one’s assets rise, they are more likely 
to spend thus increasing consumption and investment. The net export effect states that as prices 
fall domestically, foreign made goods become relatively more expensive whereas domestic 
goods become relatively cheaper. As a result, the demand for imports falls while the demand for 
exports rises, shifting net exports thus moving along the aggregate demand curve.  
 An increase in the price level will lead to a decrease in the ratio of nominal money 
supply to price level (real money stock), causing interest rates to increase and demand to interest 
sensitive components to decrease thus decreasing output. As a result, any alterations to monetary 
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or fiscal policy will shift the aggregate demand curve. For example, if the nominal money supply 
increases then output will increase at a given price level causing the aggregate demand curve to 
shift right, as seen in Exhibit 8. The aggregate demand curve is downward sloping because 
during times of high inflation central banks increase interest rates thus lowering equilibrium 
level of aggregate output.  
 
Exhibit 8: Increase in Aggregate Demand  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
The aggregate supply and demand model will be used to show the relationship between 
the price of oil and the oil market. The relationship can be seen in the following manner. The 
global demand for oil depends on global income. Therefore, an increase in national income will 
lead to an increase in the demand of oil causing the price of oil to increase. Since the price of oil 
increases, production becomes more expensive and as a result, the initial increase in “z” will 
cause the price level to increase thus shifting the aggregate supply curve to the left. Eventually, 
the initial decrease in output will return to potential output leaving only a rise in prices in the 
long run.  
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The aggregate supply and demand model helps explain how oil price shocks would affect 
output in the oil market. In order to show the link between oil prices and stock returns, two cases 
will be shown. Both cases will show how a change in oil prices affects the stock market through 
its effect on the profitability of firms, depending on whether a country is an oil importer or 
exporter. Using theory of stock price determination, an increase in profitability of a firm will 
increase a company’s dividends per share payout. Since dividends per share are used as a way to 
determine stock price valuation – through the dividend discount model - then an increase in 
dividends payout will result in higher stock prices (Investopedia, 2003).  
Each case will represent a reason to why a change in oil price will affect the stock market 
in addition to showing the different effects between oil-consuming countries and oil-producing 
countries. The first and second case will follow the trend of historical oil price changes. The 
trend tends to show that pre-1986 the majority of shocks are supply shocks whereas post-1986 
the majority of shocks are demand shocks. Therefore, the first case will represent a supply shock 
and the second case a demand shock. Each case will follow the same underlying theme that 
expected profitability affects stock prices.  
 The first case illustrates a decrease in the production of oil. For oil-consuming countries, 
as prices increase cost of production rises. Since input prices increase, the quantity of products 
that the producers are willing to sell at certain prices decrease. An increase in “z” will cause the 
price level to increase thus shifting the ASC to the left. As seen in Exhibit 7, as the ASC shifts 
left real output decreases. Since the amount of product firms are able to sell declines, firms 
augment the price of its product as a way to offset the upsurge in input prices. An increase in 
product prices will lead to diminishing demand and consumption and as a result, GDP decreases. 
The decrease in national income (GDP) is associated with a decrease in consumption and 
15		
investment thus reducing corporate earnings. In consequence of the decrease in corporate 
earnings, firms’ stock prices decrease. 
 For oil-producing countries, as oil prices rise, firms’ cash flows increase assuming the 
output of oil increases. As cash flows increase for oil producing firms there should be augmented 
investment in the oil sector. Since oil represents the main source of revenue, an increase in 
investment in the oil sector should amplify belief of economic growth and therefore shift the 
aggregate demand curve. Increase in oil prices creates a multiplier effect on the economy. 
Simply, an increase in income will lead to increases in both consumption and investment thus 
boosting profits; there is a positive correlation between oil prices and stock prices.  
 The second case demonstrates a decrease in the global demand for oil. As global demand 
weakens, oil prices decrease. This decrease in oil prices could result in a decrease in the value of 
oil exports in addition to a reduction in investment in the oil industry thus shifting the aggregate 
demand curve left. The decrease in national income will be seen in oil-producing countries. The 
decrease in cash flows for oil-producing firms could result in a reduction of the firm’s capacity 
for debt. The lower the oil price and the longer they stay at a low level, the lower the cash flows 
for drillers. This increases the difficulty in paying back loans and augmenting default risk. The 
reduction in a country’s capacity to debt could lead to debt defaults and reduced credit. In return, 
this could hurt the banking and investment sector. For oil-consuming countries, the reduction in 
oil prices will have the opposite effect presented in case one.  
In the past, during times of immense decreases in the price of oil, companies that were 
unable to withstand the fall in prices have defaulted and declared bankruptcy. The shock in 1986 
that pulled down the price of oil caused around twenty-seven percent of exploration and 
production companies to declare bankruptcy and default in the United States. In the past year, 
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forty-two American drillers have declared bankruptcy (Long, 2016). Since oil companies borrow 
a lot of money to increase production and investment during times when oil prices are high, the 
risk of default increases during oil shocks. The increase in defaults should create uncertainty in 
the market of an economic slowdown and be represented in the stock market.  
Overall, these cases show that oil price shocks could have asymmetric effects on stock 
returns - through effects on firm’s profitability - depending on whether the country is mainly an 
oil consumer or producer. In contrast to the cases above, the efficient market hypothesis states 
that oil prices should not affect stock returns. The hypothesis states that the results of oil shocks 
will immediately and efficiently be represented and incorporated in the valuation of stock prices 
thus having thus having minimal to no effects.  
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Chapter Three 
III. In Depth Analysis on Related Literature Looking at Oil Prices on Stock Prices 
 
While there is a vast amount of literature that focuses on the effects of changes in oil 
prices on the stock market, there are very few that look at the disparity between oil-consuming 
economies versus oil-producing economies. Additionally, previous literature has presented 
mixed results on how oil price shocks have affected developed countries throughout time. The 
differences in empirical results can stem from the origin of the shocks, whether asymmetric 
effects are present, and the state of stock market. The papers being reviewed can be separated 
into two categories: those that focus on different specifications of oil price increases and 
decreases and those that focus on oil price volatility.    The common theme when combining 
results from previous literature is that an increase in the price of oil (positive oil price shock) or 
increase in volatility of oil prices both have asymmetric effects on stock returns depending on the 
type of the economy. An increase in the price of oil has a negative effect on stock returns in oil 
consuming economies and a positive effect of stock returns in oil producing economies. The 
extent of these effects depends on the state of the stock market (bullish or bearish) and/or the 
origin of the shock (supply or demand).  
Cunado and Gracia (2014), Jammaz (2015), Nusair (2016), Ramos & Veiga (2013), 
Baumeister and Kilian (2016) all focus on how increases in oil prices affect stock returns. Each 
author comes to the same common conclusion stated above yet in his or her own specific way.  
 Cunado and Gracia (2014) and Jammaz (2015) both focus only on oil consuming 
economies and found that their stock markets respond negatively to oil price increases. Cunado 
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and Gracia (2014) define oil price shocks as demand and supply shocks. In contrast, Jammaz 
(2015) defines oil price shock as a net oil price increase (NOPI)1.  
The two authors differ in the countries examined and ways in which they extend 
literature. Cunado and Gracia (2014) looked at the association between stock market returns and 
oil price shocks, specifically in twelve European countries using a vector autoregressive (VAR) 
and vector error correction (VECM) models.2 With the aim of distinguishing between demand 
and supply shocks, the authors included both world oil production and world oil price. The 
authors identified whether there is a supply or demand shock by looking at the sign of the 
correlation between world oil production variation and oil price changes. Thus “when oil prices 
and world oil production vary in the same direction, [they] will identify this as an oil demand 
shock, and when the sign of the correlation between oil price and world oil production is 
negative, [they] will identify this as an oil supply shock.” (366) The authors first found that for 
several European countries – around 11- oil price increases have a significant negative effect on 
stock market returns. This result makes sense since most of these countries represent oil-
importing economies and therefore will be impacted by cost implications. Additionally, the 
authors found that oil supply shocks exert more negative effects on European stock returns than 
oil demand shocks. The authors found that oil supply shocks have a significant negative effect on 
9 countries in comparison to 4. The authors came to this conclusion by determining that supply 
shocks have more of a significant effect in the impulse response function in addition to affecting 
a greater majority of countries in the sample.  The authors support this argument and results 
through an aggregate demand and supply model, stating that as oil prices increase due to a 
																																																									2	12	European	countries:	Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal and the UK 	
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supply shock – for example, the first Gulf war – would result in an increase in the cost of energy 
inputs in oil-importing economies thus decreasing economic activity.  Cunado and Gracia (2014) 
comment on a part of the common theme – that oil price shocks has asymmetric effects - adding 
the idea that supply shocks between the periods 1973-2011 exert more of an effect on stock 
returns than demand shocks in oil consuming economies.  
In contrast to Cunado and Gracia (2014), Baumeister and Kilian (2016) support the 
hypothesis that oil demand price shocks are more important in regards to the reaction in the stock 
market than oil supply price shocks. The authors illustrate that lower fuel cost as a result of the 
decrease in prices of oil do not lead to augmented stimulus of firms who deeply rely on oil in the 
firms production. They support this argument by displaying the stock returns of companies that 
are oil-intensive in the firm’s production. Between the periods of June 2014 and March 2016, 
firms in the US economy that are reliant on oil as a major input only outperformed the rest of the 
economy marginally. On the contrary, stock returns are well above average when looking at 
sectors that are responsive to shifts in consumer demand, which makes sense since “consumer 
spending … accounted for 69% of U.S. GDP in 2014” (Baumeister and Kilian, 8). The mixed 
results between these two articles could stem from the fact that Baumeister and Kilian (2016) are 
strictly looking at the movement of stocks during the shocks rather than running regressions to 
see the association between the two.  
Jammaz (2015) focused on five developed countries within the G7 (Canada, Germany, 
Japan, United Kingdom and United States). The author looks at how an increase in oil prices 
affects stock return yet mainly focuses on how regime-shifting effects comes into play. The 
author wants to identify whether the effects of oil price shocks change depending on whether of 
the stock market is in a bullish or bearish phase during that particular shock. To take into account 
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these regime-shifting effects a two-regime MS-EGARCH model is used for the period of 1989 to 
2007 due to its ability to capture asymmetry and regime shifts. The author concludes that an 
increase in oil prices has more of a significant negative effect on stock returns during bull phases 
where stocks are booming. This conclusion is justified by the idea that during times of economic 
recession, industrial production and other economic sectors reduce their reliance on crude oil, 
according to Jammaz. By looking at Cunado and Gracia (2014), Jammaz (2015), and Baumeister 
and Kilian (2016) it can be seen that there are asymmetric effects on the stock market in oil 
consuming countries whether looking at bullish versus bearish phases or supply versus demand 
shocks.  
Nusair (2016) focused on only oil exporting economies. The research differs from 
previous literature by looking at “the short-run and long run effects of oil price shocks on the real 
GDP” in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries through the use of a cointegrating 
nonlinear autoregressive distributed lag (NARDL) model (Nusair 2016, 257).3 The author did not 
define oil price shock. The author found a nonlinear relationship between oil price shocks and 
real GDP in all countries. The findings suggest that positive oil price changes result in a more 
substantial impact on real GDP in comparison to negative oil price shocks. Additionally, 
negative oil price shocks are statistically insignificant on GDP in the long run. Thus, as oil prices 
increase in oil-exporting countries, real GDP will increase. The author’s findings are very similar 
to the common theme – that oil price shocks have asymmetric effects - even though it focuses on 
GDP rather than stock returns. A reason for why it can be inferred that an increase in GDP could 
affect stock returns is that investors usually use GDP as a guide to the overall health of the 
economy.  																																																								3	GCC	countries	include:	Bahrain,	Kingdom	of	Saudi	Arabia,	Kuwait,	Qatar,	Sultanate	of	Oman,	and	the	United	Arab	Emirates	(UAE)	
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Ramos & Veiga (2013) looked at both oil consuming and producing economies in 
regards to the effects of oil price increases on the stock market. The authors looked at 18 
countries during the period of 1988 to 2009 and used a Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroskedasticity Model (GARCH).  The oil-consuming countries included: Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
and Switzerland. Whereas the oil-producing countries included: Canada, Colombia, Mexico, 
Norway, and Russia. The authors found that an increase in the price of oil results in a negative 
impact on stock returns in oil-importing economies, which aligns with the findings from Cunado 
and Gracia (2014) and Jammaz (2015). Additionally, the authors found that an increase in the 
price of oil results in a positive impact on stock returns for oil-exporting economies, which aligns 
with Nusair (2016) results.  
In contrast to the common theme above that oil shocks have an effect on stock returns, 
Chang and Le (2015) found that oil price shocks have no association or causality in stock returns 
as a whole, but when broken down into 5-year periods there are significant impacts. The authors 
looked at three different oil economies – oil refining, exporting, and importing economies – to 
determine the association between oil prices and stock markets. Japan was used to represent oil-
importing economy, Singapore for oil refining, and Malaysia for oil exporting. The authors 
looked at data between the periods of 1997 to 2013. Within this fifteen-year range, the authors 
split the data into three sub-groups. Since the authors used a VAR model to examine the 
relationship they were able to run unit root tests, which allows for co-integration analysis, to 
show structural changes within the data range. The authors found that since the time range is so 
long there were various shocks that responded to different economic events thus decided to break 
the sample into 3 sub-groups (1997-2002, 2003-2008, and 2008-2013). The authors found that 
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none of the three different economies represented in the data passed the 5 percent statistically 
significant level thus illustrating no relationship between stock markets and oil prices in the 
entire sample. Once the author segregated the data, they found that the period of the sample 
affects the response of stock markets to oil price shocks in magnitude and sign. The effects vary 
between periods yet in the later period (2008-2013) the authors find similar results to the 
common theme where Japan (oil-importing economy) and Singapore (oil-refining) respond 
negatively and Malaysia (oil-exporting economy) responds positively.  
Diaz and Moero (2016), Balciar and Gupta (2015), and Ramos & Veiga (2013) all focus 
on how an increase in oil price volatility affects stock returns. Diaz and Moero (2016), Balciar 
and Gupta (2015) both only focus on oil-consuming countries whereas Ramos & Veiga (2013) 
focus on both oil consuming and producing economies.  
Diaz and Molero (2016) investigated the effects of fluctuations in oil price volatility in 
the stock markets of the G7 economies. The authors define oil price shocks as the ratio of the 
change in oil prices proportional to the current oil price volatility. A GARCH (1,1) model is used 
to measure oil price volatility. The authors split the data into two sections – pre and post 1986 – 
in order to identify if there are different impulse responses between periods of increase in prices 
versus decrease in prices. The authors believe that investment decisions would be affected by 
heightened volatility, reflecting stock prices in return. The authors concluded that increased oil 
price volatility post-1986 had the most significant negative effect on stock prices. The results 
show that an increase in oil price volatility would have a negative effect on stock prices in G7 
economies.  
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Balcilar and Gupta (2015) believed that oil shocks should have an effect on the stock 
market returns through their effect on expected earnings in the US economy. The authors wanted 
to look at whether times of high-volatility are different from times of low-volatility from the 
period of September 1859 through December 2013. The authors use a Markov-switching vector 
error-correction (MS-VEC) model with two regimes – high and low-volatility. High-volatility 
regimes are distinguished by having the variance of stock price series and oil mutually exceeding 
the respective variance of low-volatile regimes. The results show that high-volatility regime 
existed before 1929 (Great Depression) and after the oil price shock OPEC caused in 1973 
whereas low- volatility existed most frequently in-between those two periods. When the data was 
separated into high and low volatility they found no relationship between stock prices and oil 
shocks in low volatility regimes and a negative relationship for high volatility regimes. The 
findings that an increase in volatility causes a negative effect on stock returns are the same as 
what Diaz and Molero (2016) found. A key difference with these findings is that the authors 
found that historically, low volatility regimes occur most of the time—thus, oil price shocks do 
not have long-term significant effects on stock prices.  
The results from Ramos and Veiga (2013) indicate that the volatility of oil prices do have 
a significant effect on the stock market, yet the effects are opposite in regards to whether the 
country mainly exports or imports oil. In oil-importing economies, increased oil price volatility 
has a negative effect on stock prices whereas for oil-exporting economies it has a positive effect. 
Ramos and Veiga believe that oil price volatility has asymmetric affects because volatility can be 
considers a transmission mechanism. The authors also found that only oil price hikes in regards 
to oil price volatility is statistically significant in comparison to negative oil price shocks. The 
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reason why the authors believe that drops in oil prices are statistically insignificant is because the 
positive impact of drops in oil prices is offset by oil price volatility.  
Overall, previous literature has presented mixed empirical results yet when combined 
there is a common theme that oil price shocks have asymmetric effects on stock markets 
depending on the nature of the economy and the origin of the shock. Asymmetric affects can be 
defined as a difference between supply and demand shocks, oil exporting and importing 
economies, and whether the price of oil increases or decreases. This paper is going extend 
previous literature by looking in depth at developed countries to see if oil price shocks have 
different effects on the countries in the G7 plus Norway and whether those effects have changed 
in comparison to each countries historical transition as whether oil-producer or consumer. It 
differs from previous literature as it breaks down 8 countries in the OECD and separates them 
into oil producing and consuming economies.  
In accordance with Cunado and Gracia (2014), Chang and Le (2015), and Diaz and 
Moero (2016) this paper is going to use a vector autoregressive (VAR) model to determine the 
relationship between oil price shocks and stock returns. Taking the results from the VAR model, 
impulse response function (IRF) will be generated to see the magnitude of the effects. The use of 
IRF aligns with Cunado and Gracia (2014), Chang and Le (2015), Balcilar and Gupta (2015), 
and Diaz and Moero (2016).  
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Chapter Four 
IV. Do Oil Price Shocks Affect Stock Returns? 
 
4.1 Introduction to Chapter:  
 
 This chapter is going to examine the relationship between stock returns and oil price 
shocks in oil consuming and producing economies. The first step in this process is to identify 
which countries in the sample are mainly oil producers and which countries are mainly oil 
consumers. By looking at descriptive statistics and graphs of the data it is determined that 
France, Germany, and Japan are all distinctly oil consuming countries whereas, Norway, Canada, 
United Kingdom, and the United States are all oil producing economies. These countries were 
separated to see if the effect of oil price shocks on stock returns depends on the nature of the 
economy.  
 Second, this chapter looks at the whole sample and runs vector autoregressive models and 
impulse response functions in order to determine the relationship between oil price shocks and 
stock returns. The results indicate that for the full sample, oil price shocks on stock returns are 
statistically insignificant for each country – there is no relationship. Since there was no 
relationship between the variables at a macro level, we decided to look at the sample in sub-
groups to adjust for changes within the data.  The data was segregated into 4 sub-groups. The 
sub-groups were decided by following the separation of data in previous literature. Once the data 
was separated, the results illustrated statistically significant effects. France and Canada presented 
the two most important results. In the second sub-group the French stock market responded 
negatively by a maximum of 3.6% to an increase in oil prices. In the third sub-group Canada 
responded positively by a maximum of 6.2% to an increase in oil prices.   
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4.2 Distinguishing Oil Producing Countries from Oil Consuming Countries: 
 
 Graph 1 illustrates the relationship and growth rates between the production and 
consumption of oil per country. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the annual ratio of oil 
production to consumption. The data of production and consumption for each country came from 
the U.S. Energy Information Administration. The descriptive statistics illustrate that Japan, 
France, and Germany are distinctly oil-consuming countries with a ratio of production to 
consumption less than 0.03 percent. Additionally, Table 2 shows that Japan produces the least 
amount of oil in all the countries in the sample. Norway, Canada, United Kingdom (UK), and 
United States are on average oil producers where the production outweighs consumption. 
Although these countries can be separated into two categories, further distinction still needs to be 
shown. The United States is both a massive oil producer as it is a consumer with a ratio of oil 
production to consumption around 0.32 percent on average. Therefore, the effects of oil price 
shocks could be minimal due to the diversification.  An increase in oil prices might be offset by 
the profits of its exportation of oil and vice versa. Although the United States has been a major 
consumer of oil, the country has increased its production immensely starting around 2007 due to 
the rise in fracking.  
Norway is distinctly an oil producing country. Although the ratio has decreased over 
time, it is still the only country in this study where the oil production is at least 7 times larger 
than oil consumption with a mean of producing around eleven times more than consuming. The 
magnitude of Norway’s production to consumption compared to the other countries can be seen 
in graph 2. Graph 3 illustrates the production to consumption excluding Norway. In graph 3 it 
can be seen that Canada, the UK, Germany, and the US are all oil producers with a ratio above 
0.0.  
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In the UK, it can be seen that the production of oil started to drop dramatically in 2003 
and constantly fell into 2014. The UK between 1994-2000 relatively was a high oil producer 
with a maximum ratio of around 1.5. After 2000, the nation started to drop its resources in 
producing oil as seen in 2014 having a minimum ratio of around 0.5 due to country reverting to a 
net oil importer. Although the country started to produce less, this paper still considers it an oil 
producing economy compared to its peers.  
Although in Germany and Japan there seems to be a sharp increase and decrease in the 
production of oil, in all cases the ratio of production to consumption is less than 0.03 percent 
thus these changes do not need to be discussed. France’s production of oil, as seen in appendix 
A, has gradually decreased over time. Since these three countries are decreasing their production 
in oil, they are increasing their reliance on the importation of oil and can be confirmed as an oil 
consuming economy.    
As time progresses, Canada is increasing its production per consumption starting from a 
minimum of around 0.5 in 1999 jumping up to 1.5 in 2014. Therefore, a negative price shock 
could affect the Canadian market in 2016 whereas in 1994 the effects are probably less 
significant.  
Using the descriptive statistics on production to consumption in all countries represented 
in the sample one can estimate how a shock in oil prices will affect each country’s stock returns. 
Based on results of previous literature, in response to a positive oil price shock (oil price 
increase), Norway’s stock market will have the greatest positive impact due to its massive 
reliance on production to consumption. Additionally, it can be assumed that countries that highly 
rely on the consumption of oil – for example, Japan – will have a negative reaction to a positive 
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oil price shock. The interesting case will be to see how the United States, which is both a 
massive oil consumer and producer, will react to an oil price shock.  
 
 
Graph 1: Ratio of oil production to oil consumption, Annual  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 2: Production to consumption excluding Norway  
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Table 1: Production per Consumption Descriptive Statistics   
        
        
 CANADA FRANCE 
GERMAN
Y JAPAN 
NORWA
Y UK US 
        
         Mean  1.106147  0.013889  0.022540  0.001328  11.53957  1.035979  0.313012 
 Median  1.070070  0.011454  0.021355  0.001171  12.85000  1.031302  0.295518 
 Maximum  1.501039  0.030011  0.027420  0.002104  15.41627  1.482054  0.458704 
 Minimum  0.945933  0.008865  0.019198  0.000926  7.032110  0.517763  0.245503 
 Std. Dev.  0.137713  0.005837  0.002648  0.000341  2.803297  0.332396  0.055817 
 Skewness  1.360351  1.537577  0.461535  1.128819 -0.372416 -0.165844  0.865810 
 Kurtosis  4.475848  4.427689  1.808301  2.949049  1.580456  1.537998  3.259739 
        
 Jarque-Bera  8.382802  10.05801  1.988179  4.462083  2.248644  1.966535  2.682728 
 Probability  0.015125  0.006545  0.370060  0.107416  0.324873  0.374087  0.261489 
        
 Sum  23.22908  0.291678  0.473342  0.027889  242.3310  21.75557  6.573246 
 Sum Sq. 
Dev.  0.379299  0.000681  0.000140  2.32E-06  157.1695  2.209747  0.062311 
        
 Observatio
ns  21  21  21  21  21  21  21 
 
 
4.3 Data Description for VAR:  
 
 The variables that are going to be looked at include: APSP crude oil index, UK Brent 
crude oil, stock market indices, real gross domestic product, and short-term interest rates. All 
variables except for interest rates will be represented in the natural log form following previous 
research. The data are obtained from the U.S. Energy information Administration, FRED 
economic data, OECD data, yahoo finance, and the wall street journal. Table 1 exhibits the 
definition of the variables and the sources.  
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Table 1: Variable description and sources  
Name Description  Source 
Real Stock Prices Share Price, Average Quarterly Data Index Yahoo Finance, WSJ 
Oil Prices 
1) Global price of APSP crude oil index©, Index 
2005 = 100, Quarterly 
2) UK Brent Crude Oil, Quarterly 
Federal Reserve 
Economic Data, EIA 
short-term energy 
outlook 
Real GDP  National Currency, Quarterly Data 
Federal Reserve 
Economic Data, OECD 
Interest Rates  Short-term interest rates, 3-month OECD Data 
*Real stock prices and oil prices are calculated manually using the CPI per country  
Oil prices are measured using APSP and the UK Brent crude oil index. APSP is defined 
as the average of spot price: WTI, Dubai, and Brent oil. In addition to the APSP the UK Brent oil 
price will also be looked at in this study. Real gross domestic product (GDP) is included as a 
proxy for economic activity and to examine the effects of shocks on GDP growth rates. Short-
term interest rates will help control for inflation and has been represented in all literature 
reviewed in this paper. The stock markets will be segregated per country. Six of seven (G7) 
countries are included: the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and the United 
Kingdom. In addition to the G7 countries, Norway will also be examined. The stock market 
variables will be represented as quarterly average share prices.  
 APSP and the UK Brent Crude oil prices are illustrated in Graph 5. In 1997, there was a 
decrease in the price of oil due to overproduction paired with a financial crisis in Asia and 
Europe. In 2001, we see a slight decrease in the price of oil due to overproduction by OPEC and 
non-OPEC countries paired with a decrease in demand of oil caused by the dot-com burst. 
Starting in 2003 the price of oil skyrocket and reached its peak in 2008, Q3. The increase in the 
price of oil can be contributed to increased tension in the Middle East, an increase in demand 
from China and Asian countries due to economic expansion, and the depreciation of US currency 
(BBC, 2008). In 2008, Q4 the price of oil plummeted due to the global financial crisis. Shortly 
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after the global financial crisis, oil prices started to recover as a result of a slowdown in global 
economic decline and an increase in consumer confidence (BBC, 2009). The drop in 2014 was 
associated to both demand and supply side factors where economic expansion halted and 
production of oil increased. A more in-depth analysis of oil prices can be seen in the 
introduction.  
Graph 5: Oil Price  
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Graph 6: Stock prices per country  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
The stock prices for all seven countries are volatile and exhibit large increases and decreases as 
seen in Graph 6. As a whole, stock prices tend to increase from 1994-2016 in all countries 
except the United Kingdom. All stocks returns drop dramatically in 2001 – 2002 and 2008 and 
can be associated to the dot-com crash where the markets transitioned from bullish to bearish 
state and the latter to the global financial crisis. The growth rates of all stock prices also show 
this trend of correlation, as they seem to move in a similar relationship throughout time, as seen 
in Graph 7.  
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Graph 7: Growth rates of stock prices  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GDP between the periods of 1994 to 2016 looks strikingly similar across all seven 
countries with the exception of Japan, as seen in Graph 8. Canada, France, Germany, and the US 
all have a gradual and low volatility increase in real GDP. Each country exhibits a drop in real 
GDP during the financial crisis in 2008 except for the United States. Norway also show a gradual 
increase throughout time yet tend to be more volatile as seen with the short and sharp increases 
and decreases. The volatility in Norway GDP can also be seen in its growth rates, represented in 
Graph 9.  
Interest rates tend to be correlated, moving together throughout time in all countries 
except Japan. The fall in interest rates in 2002 and 2008 can be attributed to economic recessions 
caused by the dot-com bubble burst and the global financial crisis. The majority of countries 
turned to a monetary policy of a zero interest-rate policy after the financial crisis in 2008 as a 
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way to stimulate the economy and prevent economic collapse. Japan was one of the first 
countries to employ this policy, as seen in Graph 10. This policy was first employed in Japan 
after it experienced an asset price bubble burst in the 1990’s and stayed employed until the 
present as a way to combat deflation and advance economic recovery.  
 
Graph 8: GDP per Country  
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Graph 9: GDP Growth Rates  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 10: Interest Rates per Country  
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4.4 VAR Estimations & Results:  
 
In accordance with Cunado and Gracia (2014), Chang and Le (2015), and Diaz and 
Moero (2016) this paper is going to use a VAR model yet differs with using an unstructured 
reduced form vector-autoregressive model (VAR) to determine the relationship between oil price 
shocks and stock returns.4 A VAR model is flexible and tests the effects of every variable on 
each other, making it so there are no strictly exogenous variables and no strictly endogenous 
variables. Therefore, each variable used in the paper is a linear function explained by its own 
lagged variable in addition to current and past values of the remaining variables. The amount of 
lags depends specifically on the data and variables yet it is common that any lag after 4 are 
insignificant. An example can be illustrated using three variables x, y, v in the following linear 
equation:  
     Xt= a1Xt-1 + a1Yt-1 + a1Vt-1 + a2Xt-2 + a2Yt-2 + a2Vt-2  + a3Xt-3 + a3Yt-3 + a3Vt-3 + a4Xt-4 + a4Yt-4 + a4Vt-4 + et  
     Yt= a1Yt-1 + a1Xt-1 + a1Vt-1 + a2Yt-2 + a2Xt-2 + a2Vt-2  + a3Yt-3 + a3Xt-3 + a3Vt-3 + a4Yt-4 + a4Xt-4 + a4Vt-4+ et 
     Vt= a1Vt-1 + a1Xt-1 + a1Yt-1 + a2Vt-2 + a2Xt-2 + a2Yt-2  + a3Vt-3 + a3Xt-3 + a3Yt-3 + a4Vt-4 + a4Xt-4 + a4Yt-4+ et 
 
 
In the linear equation above, each variable is being expressed of its own lag and lags of all other 
variables going back for four specified time periods. Before a VAR model can be used, we need 
to test whether the variables are stationary and cointegrated. The results of the VAR model 
allows for the creation of impulse response functions. Impulse response functions show the effect 
of a shock to one of the variables on another, with the outer dashed lines signifying confidence 
intervals. Thus, these impulses are ideal for testing the effect of oil price shocks on stock 
																																																								4	The	discussion	on	the	VAR	model	follows	Stock	and	Watson	(2001)	on	vector	autoregressions	in	addition	to	econometric	views	(eviews)	electronic	guide		
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markets. In order to see the effect of a shock on each country’s stock market, each stock market 
will need its own linear equation.  
 Since this paper is looking at macro data and the VAR model requires it, we need to 
consider the possibility that these time series are not stationary – there are trends in the data. For 
each country, an Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test needs to be completed on all variables 
to see if they are stationary in order to avoid a spurious relationship. Aligning with previous 
research all variables will be represented in the natural log form except for short-term interest 
rates as a way to stabilize the variability in the data. The results show that the majority of the 
variables are stationary in the first difference; they are intergraded in the order of one. The fact 
that the variables are stationary in the first difference means that the changes in the series 
between periods (growth rates) are constant over time. Two variables –Norway’s GDP, and 
Japan’s interest rate – do not follow this pattern. Norway’s GDP appears to be stationary when 
tested with just a constant, yet non-stationary when the trend is included in the test equation. 
Japans interest rate is stationary without any corrections made. Therefore, all variables –except 
Japans interest rates - will be represented in the first difference. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
unit root tests can be seen in Table 2. The findings that the majority of variables are stationary at 
the first difference is also found in some previous studies, including: Cunado and Gracia (2014), 
Chang and Le (2015), and Diaz and Moero (2016).  
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Table 2: ADF unit root tests summary  
 
ADF 
test         
 Level    
First 
Difference   
  (i)  (ii)    (i) (ii) 
Stock Prices      
Canada -1.997 -3.023  -7.272** -7.312** 
France -2.34 -2.171  -6.954** -6.981** 
Germany -1.827 -2.473  -6.954** -6.929** 
Japan -2.398 -2.237  -6.811** -6.847** 
Norway  -1.073 -2.284  -8.181** -8.145** 
UK -1.258 -2.019  -6.482** -6.494** 
US -2.534 -2.829  -7.179** -7.284** 
      
Oil Prices 
(APSP) -1.577 -1.339  -6.794 -6.893 
      
GDP       
Canada -1.603 -1.523  -5.253** -5.423** 
France -1.807 -1.359  -4.805** -5.023** 
Germany -0.892 -3.283  -6.630** -6.596** 
Japan -1.669 -1.717  -8.659** -8.608** 
Norway  
-
4.060** -2.485  -20.334** -21.948** 
UK -1.267 -1.714  -3.265** -3.290** 
US 0.04 -2.421  -6.139** -6.116** 
      
Interest Rates      
Canada -2.042 -3.077  -7.871** -7.791** 
France -1.643 -3.044  -6.316** -6.275** 
Germany -1.747 -3.178  -5.276** -5.239** 
Japan -3.917 
-
3.77**  - - 
Norway  -2.188 -3.376  -5.592** -5.553** 
UK -1.341 -3.632  -4.893** -4.893** 
US -1.672 -2.774   -5.217** -5.155** 
Notes. (i) Constant; (ii) constant and linear trend. ** Means significant 
at 1% 
  
After a unit root test is run, the Johansen and Juselius test was used to test for 
cointegration. Both the trace and maximum eigenvalue tests statistics will be looked at and the 
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results can be seen in Table 3. In all countries and specifications of oil prices, the null hypothesis 
of no cointergration at the 5 percent level is rejected. These outcomes propose the all four 
variables examined in the paper (oil prices, interest rates, gross domestic product, and stock 
prices) have a long-term relationship in Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Norway, United 
Kingdom, and United States. The findings that the null hypothesis of no cointergration at the 5 
percent level is rejected align with the findings of Balciar and Gupta (2015) and Diaz and Moero 
(2016).  
 
Table 3: Johansen and Juselius cointegration tests (variables: oil prices, interest rates, GDP, 
and stock price)  
  R=0    
    (i)  (ii)  
Real UK Brent Oil 
Prices     
Canada Trace statistic  85.26** 92.89** 
 max-eig statistic 34.13** 34.17** 
France Trace statistic 91.55** 104.7** 
 max-eig statistic 36.24** 38.66** 
Germany Trace statistic 97.72** 100.3** 
 max-eig statistic 36.24** 37.62** 
Japan Trace statistic 115.0** 117.7** 
 max-eig statistic 39.92** 42.76** 
Norway  Trace statistic 229.2** 244.46** 
 max-eig statistic 157.85** 171.65** 
UK Trace statistic 163.2** 182.89** 
 max-eig statistic 99.56** 116.14** 
US Trace statistic 93.26** 96.34** 
 max-eig statistic 37.89** 40.93** 
APSP Oil Prices     
Canada Trace statistic 85.14** 92.93** 
 max-eig statistic 33.49** 33.54** 
France Trace statistic 92.26** 106.05** 
 max-eig statistic 36.61** 39.36** 
Germany Trace statistic 96.32** 99.31** 
 max-eig statistic 35.64** 37.28** 
Japan Trace statistic 114.9** 117.8** 
 max-eig statistic 40.03** 43.08** 
Norway  Trace statistic 228.9** 244.06** 
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 max-eig statistic 157.4** 171.04** 
UK Trace statistic 163.1** 182.78** 
 max-eig statistic 99.48** 115.9** 
US Trace statistic 92.63** 95.81** 
 max-eig statistic 37.95** 41.23** 
Real Imported Crude Oil Price    
Canada Trace statistic 84.61** 92.51** 
 max-eig statistic 33.74** 33.89** 
France Trace statistic 93.17** 106.96** 
 max-eig statistic 36.94** 40.20** 
Germany Trace statistic 97.43** 100.3** 
 max-eig statistic 36.67** 38.26** 
Japan Trace statistic  116.9** 119.6** 
 max-eig statistic 41.21** 44.12** 
Norway  Trace statistic 225.8** 240.8** 
 max-eig statistic 156.2** 169.7** 
UK Trace statistic 163.7** 182.99** 
 max-eig statistic 98.36** 114.39** 
US Trace statistic 90.9** 93.95** 
  max-eig statistic 36.98** 40.01** 
 Notes. (i) Constant; (ii) constant and linear trend. ** means significant at 5% level  
4.5.1 Results for Entire Sample Period  
 
The VAR model that is estimated in this paper is a common method to determine the 
effects of price shocks on stock returns and can be seen as the method used in Cunado and 
Gracia (2014), Chang and Le (2015), and Diaz and Moero (2016). Subsequent to the estimations 
of the VAR, impulse response functions can be run to determine the influence of oil price shocks 
on stock returns in multiple developed countries. 
When the VAR estimate for the full sample (1994, Q1 – 2016, Q1) was run for each 
country the results indicate that oil price shocks on stock markets are statistically insignificant at 
the 95% confidence interval for each oil specification, which aligns with Le and Chang (2015) 
results for the full sample being insignificant at the 5% level. The estimated t-statistics for the 
full sample can be seen in Table 4. The Akaike information criteria and Schwarz information 
criteria were used to accurately determine the autoregressive lag length.  Canada, France, 
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Germany, Japan, and the United states all were estimated with two lags whereas both Norway 
and the United Kingdom were estimated with four lags.  These results can be backed by the 
efficient market hypothesis, which states that stock markets are efficient in reflecting 
information. In regards to this paper, the efficient market hypothesis would state that if the prices 
of stocks were unable to be enhanced by the utilization of other information – for example, 
fluctuations in oil price – then it can be said that the configuration of stock prices in the stock 
market are already incorporating accessible public and private information. Thus, it can be 
assumed that stock markets are able to incorporate information about the result of an oil price 
shock and integrate it efficiently and promptly into the stock prices as a result having no 
significant effect.   
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Table 4: Summary Statistics for Stock Prices in Full Sample  
	 Canada	 France	 Germany	 Japan	 Norway	 UK	 US	
IR(-1)	 0.012	 -0.034	 -0.074	 -0.153	 -0.072	 -0.072	 -0.020	
	 (-0.020)	 (-0.025)	 (-0.047)	 (-0.074)	 (-0.026)	 (-0.026)	 (-0.020)	
	 [	0.619]	 [-1.359]	 [-1.583]	 [-2.079]	 [-2.804]	 [-2.804]	 [-0.979]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
IR(-2)	 0.004	 -0.039	 -0.016	 0.107	 0.002	 0.002	 0.027	
	 (-0.017)	 (-0.024)	 (-0.040)	 (-0.068)	 (-0.026)	 (-0.026)	 (-0.018)	
	 [	0.259]	 [-1.616]	 [-0.384]	 [	1.573]	 [	0.080]	 [	0.080]	 [	1.473]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
BRENT(-1)	 -0.061	 -0.094	 -0.053	 -0.086	 -0.100	 -0.100	 0.015	
	 (-0.065)	 (-0.068)	 (-0.080)	 (-0.076)	 (-0.107)	 (-0.107)	 (-0.052)	
	 [-0.937]	 [-1.390]	 [-0.668]	 [-1.136]	 [-0.933]	 [-0.933]	 [	0.281]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
BRENT(-2)	 0.033	 0.008	 0.049	 -0.034	 0.147	 0.147	 -0.052	
	 (-0.068)	 (-0.068)	 (-0.088)	 (-0.078)	 (-0.097)	 (-0.097)	 (-0.053)	
	 [	0.487]	 [	0.116]	 [	0.558]	 [-0.439]	 [	1.518]	 [	1.518]	 [-0.985]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
GDP(-1)	 1.755	 8.030	 1.820	 1.166	 -0.857	 -0.857	 0.311	
	 (-1.782)	 (-2.778)	 (-1.721)	 (-1.080)	 (-1.212)	 (-1.212)	 (-0.654)	
	 [	0.984]	 [	2.890]	 [	1.057]	 [	1.079]	 [-0.707]	 [-0.707]	 [	0.475]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
GDP(-2)	 -3.037	 -2.935	 -0.626	 -0.089	 1.132	 1.132	 -0.109	
	 (-1.697)	 (-2.585)	 (-1.702)	 (-1.014)	 (-1.148)	 (-1.148)	 (-0.643)	
	 [-1.789]	 [-1.135]	 [-0.367]	 [-0.087]	 [	0.986]	 [	0.986]	 [-0.168]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
SP(-1)	 0.317	 0.185	 0.269	 0.266	 0.124	 0.124	 0.251	
	 (-0.130)	 (-0.116)	 (-0.122)	 (-0.123)	 (-0.118)	 (-0.118)	 (-0.117)	
	 [	2.444]	 [	1.590]	 [	2.198]	 [	2.172]	 [	1.047]	 [	1.047]	 [	2.133]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
SP(-2)	 -0.154	 0.016	 0.086	 -0.105	 -0.013	 -0.013	 0.073	
	 (-0.133)	 (-0.119)	 (-0.124)	 (-0.125)	 (-0.133)	 (-0.133)	 (-0.119)	
	 [-1.154]	 [	0.132]	 [	0.689]	 [-0.837]	 [-0.098]	 [-0.098]	 [	0.613]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
C	 0.016	 -0.020	 -0.001	 0.013	 0.010	 0.010	 0.006	
	 (-0.014)	 (-0.016)	 (-0.015)	 (-0.013)	 (-0.016)	 (-0.016)	 (-0.010)	
	 [	1.152]	 [-1.277]	 [-0.070]	 [	1.011]	 [	0.616]	 [	0.616]	 [	0.593]	
**Note: () = Standard Error, [] = t-statistic  
Findings indicate no relationship between oil price shocks and stock returns in the full 
sample, therefore the use of impulse response functions can be looked at to confirm these results. 
A generalized impulse response function of stock market returns to UK Brent oil prices to the 
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full sample can be seen in Figure 1 for all countries represented in the sample: Canada, France, 
Germany, Norway, United Kingdom, and the United States. Using a generalized impulse 
response functions is invariant to how the variables are ordered in the VAR model and was used 
in previous literature by Cunado and Gracia (2014), Chang and Le (2015), and Diaz and Moero 
(2016).  
 Canada and Norway’s stock market both have a positive response to a shock in oil prices. 
Although there is a positive relationship, it cannot be trusted since the estimated t-statistic is 
statistically insignificant as seen in Table 4. In Canada, the generalized impulse response 
function shows that within a time period of ten quarters a shock in oil prices will cause a positive 
response in the stock market. The impulse response illustrates that a ten percent standard 
deviation of a shock will immediately cause a three percent increase in stock returns in the first 
quarter and then die down halfway after the first quarter. An oil price shock in Norway has a 
positive 4 percent on stock returns and similarly becomes insignificant right after the first 
quarter. Both France and Germany also has an immediate positive response of around 1.4 percent 
that soon turns negative after the first quarter, yet was not significant as seen by the 95% 
confidence intervals. The United Kingdom stock price has no response to a one standard 
deviation shock of oil prices. The United States stock market has little to no effect in response to 
a one standard deviation shock in oil prices. A reason as to why the United States stock prices 
are not affected by oil price shocks could be because of its diverse portfolio and due to it being 
both a huge producer and consumer of oil thus offsetting an increase or decrease in oil prices.  
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Figure 1: IRF for the Full Sample  
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4.5.2 Results for Sub-Periods  
 
Since oil price shocks have no effect on stock returns in the full sample, this paper is 
going to separate the data into smaller samples to adjust for changes to see if the results are 
different. To take into account different geo-political and economic events, the whole sample 
will be divided into multiple sub-groups based on the segregation of data in previous literature. 
The segregation of the entire sample into sub-groups will help examine how oil price shocks 
affect the stock market in addition to whether the nature of the shock is important. The data will 
Norway:		
UK:		
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be segregated into 4 sub-groups that will try and correct structural changes within the data: Q1, 
1994 to Q4, 2002 is looked at in sub-group one; Q1, 2003 to Q3, 2008 will be covered by the 
second sub-group; Q4, 2008 to Q2, 2012 by the third sub-group; and, Q3, 2012 to Q1, 2016 by 
the fourth sub-group. These sub-groups will help look at the disparity between the relationships 
in oil price shocks on stock returns in the long run versus the short-term and aligns with Le and 
Change (2015) division of their full sample.  
The first sub-group will represent a time in which the price of oil had little fluctuation 
between sixteen and forty-two dollars a barrel with changes associated to demand pressures. In 
1997 to 1998 there was a decrease in the demand for oil caused by a financial crisis in Asia and 
decreased activity in Europe, causing oil prices to drop to sixteen dollars a barrel, as seen in 
section one of this paper. Due to changes in demand pressures caused by the Iraq War, there was 
a constant rise in oil prices from 2003 to quarter 3, 2008 where oil prices peaked; this reason is 
why the second sub-group will cover Q1, 2003 to Q3, 2008. Oil prices fell after 2008, quarter 3 
due to economic weakness, the third sub-group will represent the rebound in oil prices, and the 
fourth sub-group will represent the immense drop in oil prices caused by both supply and 
demand side factors.   
 When the sample is segregated into four sub-groups, it presents mixed results. Both 
Germany and the UK are statistically insignificant at the 95% confidence interval in all four sub-
groups. In the first sub-group that represented the time period of 1994, Q1 to 2002, Q4, both 
Canada and the United States were statistically significant. Canada was significant in the second 
lag with a t-statistic of 2.35, as seen in Table 5. In the first quarter, the response of Canada’s 
stock market was positive, with a 1.4% margin, although the impulse response is not significant. 
There is some uncertainty in the result of a positive relationship since the response lies within the 
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confidence intervals signaled by the red dotted lines in Figure 2. The United States is significant 
in the first lag with a t-statistic of -2.16 yet similarly to Canada its stock market positive response 
of 1.2% does not pass the confidence intervals. Both Germany and Norway were statistically 
significant in the second lag yet when the appropriate lags were added to the regression the two 
countries became insignificant.  
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Table 5: Summary Estimated T-Statistics for Stock Prices in Sub-groups  
 
A) Sub-group 1: 
	 Canada	 France	 Germany	 Japan	 Norway	 UK	 US	
IR(-1)	 0.003	 -0.013	 -0.037	 -0.163	 -0.055	 0.040	 0.001	
	 (-0.025)	 (-0.035)	 (-0.072)	 (-0.090)	 (-0.040)	 (-0.030)	 (-0.034)	
	 [	0.135]	 [-0.360]	 [-0.514]	 [-1.813]	 [-1.355]	 [	1.324]	 [	0.026]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
IR(-2)	 -0.002	 -0.034	 -0.014	 0.148	 0.015	 -0.050	 0.030	
	 (-0.021)	 (-0.034)	 (-0.059)	 (-0.085)	 (-0.037)	 (-0.032)	 (-0.030)	
	 [-0.100]	 [-1.017]	 [-0.232]	 [	1.734]	 [	0.402]	 [-1.587]	 [	1.002]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
BRENT(-1)	 -0.085	 -0.200	 -0.211	 -0.155	 -0.129	 0.019	 -0.231	
	 (-0.119)	 (-0.142)	 (-0.164)	 (-0.183)	 (-0.202)	 (-0.098)	 (-0.107)	
	 [-0.711]	 [-1.409]	 [-1.285]	 [-0.847]	 [-0.639]	 [	0.195]	 [-2.159]**	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
BRENT(-2)	 0.262	 0.243	 0.328	 0.125	 0.444	 0.012	 0.065	
	 (-0.111)	 (-0.141)	 (-0.166)	 (-0.151)	 (-0.181)	 (-0.089)	 (-0.118)	
	 [	2.351]**	 [	1.724]	 [	1.684]	 [	0.823]	 [	2.447]	 [	0.137]	 [	0.550]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
GDP(-1)	 6.873	 13.364	 2.605	 -0.233	 -0.563	 -5.275	 -0.226	
	 (-3.153)	 (-6.537)	 (-3.134)	 (-2.262)	 (-2.140)	 (-2.777)	 (-1.041)	
	 [	2.179]	 [	2.044]	 [	0.831]	 [-0.102]	 [-0.263]	 [-1.899]	 [-0.217]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
GDP(-2)	 -5.815	 -5.150	 -0.194	 -0.385	 0.866	 -2.305	 -0.109	
	 (-3.879)	 (-5.820)	 (-3.421)	 (-2.127)	 (-2.051)	 (-2.857)	 (-0.991)	
	 [-1.499]	 [-0.884]	 [-0.056]	 [-0.180]	 [	0.422]	 [-0.806]	 [-0.109]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
SP(-1)	 0.191	 0.308	 0.434	 0.166	 0.011	 0.435	 0.101	
	 (-0.193)	 (-0.192)	 (-0.193)	 (-0.199)	 (-0.196)	 (-0.192)	 (-0.198)	
	 [	0.992]	 [	1.602]	 [	2.243]	 [	0.835]	 [	0.057]	 [	2.273]	 [	0.511]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
SP(-2)	 0.024	 -0.137	 -0.010	 0.114	 -0.249	 -0.205	 0.234	
	 (-0.194)	 (-0.231)	 (-0.255)	 (-0.257)	 (-0.236)	 (-0.200)	 (-0.218)	
	 [	0.125]	 [-0.593]	 [-0.041]	 [	0.445]	 [-1.056]	 [-1.024]	 [	1.075]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
C	 -0.004	 -0.044	 -0.011	 -0.020	 0.003	 0.049	 0.018	
	 (-0.039)	 (-0.050)	 (-0.031)	 (-0.024)	 (-0.038)	 (-0.032)	 (-0.019)	
	 [-0.109]	 [-0.885]	 [-0.368]	 [-0.806]	 [	0.067]	 [	1.536]	 [	0.946]	
**Note: () = Standard Error, [] = t-statistic, ** = statistically significant at 5% level 
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B) Sub-group 2:  
	 Canada	 France	 Germany	 Japan	 Norway	 UK	 US	
IR(-1)	 0.043	 -0.038	 0.071	 -0.090	 -0.166	 -0.067	 0.028	
	 (-0.044)	 (-0.065)	 (-0.144)	 (-0.243)	 (-0.067)	 (-0.044)	 (-0.030)	
	 [	0.990]	 [-0.589]	 [	0.491]	 [-0.371]	 [-2.485]	 [-1.523]	 [	0.940]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
IR(-2)	 0.023	 -0.087	 -0.144	 -0.002	 0.087	 0.002	 -0.002	
	 (-0.039)	 (-0.068)	 (-0.119)	 (-0.266)	 (-0.074)	 (-0.043)	 (-0.031)	
	 [	0.596]	 [-1.281]	 [-1.208]	 [-0.007]	 [	1.179]	 [	0.049]	 [-0.053]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
BRENT(-1)	 -0.251	 -0.355	 -0.472	 -0.186	 -0.541	 0.051	 -0.236	
	 (-0.104)	 (-0.109)	 (-0.200)	 (-0.187)	 (-0.209)	 (-0.107)	 (-0.142)	
	 [-2.420]**	 [-3.263]**	 [-2.362]	 [-0.994]	 [-2.585]**	 [	0.478]	 [-1.660]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
BRENT(-2)	 0.110	 -0.018	 -0.131	 0.355	 0.232	 0.103	 -0.103	
	 (-0.133)	 (-0.127)	 (-0.218)	 (-0.185)	 (-0.256)	 (-0.102)	 (-0.132)	
	 [	0.828]	 [-0.142]	 [-0.600]	 [	1.920]	 [	0.906]	 [	1.007]	 [-0.775]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
GDP(-1)	 7.052	 -6.650	 -1.783	 6.320	 -2.447	 -5.057	 0.310	
	 (-3.775)	 (-5.149)	 (-4.263)	 (-3.486)	 (-2.214)	 (-2.920)	 (-0.899)	
	 [	1.868]	 [-1.291]	 [-0.418]	 [	1.812]	 [-1.105]	 [-1.731]	 [	0.345]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
GDP(-2)	 -7.607	 -1.302	 -2.887	 5.939	 4.037	 -1.917	 0.297	
	 (-4.619)	 (-3.988)	 (-5.191)	 (-3.515)	 (-2.353)	 (-3.590)	 (-0.937)	
	 [-1.646]	 [-0.326]	 [-0.556]	 [	1.689]	 [	1.715]	 [-0.534]	 [	0.317]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
SP(-1)	 -0.334	 -0.032	 -0.325	 0.085	 -0.067	 -0.086	 -0.268	
	 (-0.257)	 (-0.201)	 (-0.296)	 (-0.225)	 (-0.284)	 (-0.278)	 (-0.320)	
	 [-1.298]	 [-0.158]	 [-1.100]	 [	0.380]	 [-0.234]	 [-0.310]	 [-0.838]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
SP(-2)	 0.178	 0.783	 0.526	 -0.071	 0.562	 0.566	 0.317	
	 (-0.172)	 (-0.175)	 (-0.178)	 (-0.187)	 (-0.199)	 (-0.202)	 (-0.217)	
	 [	1.037]	 [	4.477]	 [	2.945]	 [-0.381]	 [	2.826]	 [	2.802]	 [	1.458]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
C	 0.043	 0.071	 0.083	 0.021	 0.033	 0.033	 0.019	
	 (-0.028)	 (-0.029)	 (-0.037)	 (-0.029)	 (-0.043)	 (-0.026)	 (-0.019)	
	 [	1.534]	 [	2.416]	 [	2.266]	 [	0.719]	 [	0.778]	 [	1.263]	 [	1.025]	
**Note: () = Standard Error, [] = t-statistic, ** = statistically significant at 5% level  
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C)Sub-group 3:  
	 Canada	 France	 Germany	 Japan	 Norway	 UK	 US	
IR(-1)	 -0.103	 -0.115	 -0.148	 -1.064	 -0.024	 0.020	 -0.104	
	 (-0.112)	 (-0.122)	 (-0.150)	 (-0.646)	 (-0.146)	 (-0.045)	 (-0.099)	
	 [-0.919]	 [-0.945]	 [-0.988]	 [-1.646]	 [-0.168]	 [	0.434]	 [-1.055]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
IR(-2)	 0.154	 -0.060	 -0.127	 0.658	 -0.017	 -0.093	 0.078	
	 (-0.081)	 (-0.072)	 (-0.096)	 (-0.560)	 (-0.085)	 (-0.038)	 (-0.074)	
	 [	1.906]	 [-0.840]	 [-1.325]	 [	1.176]	 [-0.199]	 [-2.450]	 [	1.049]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
BRENT(-1)	 -0.636	 -0.147	 0.252	 -0.302	 0.104	 0.086	 0.268	
	 (-0.281)	 (-0.229)	 (-0.237)	 (-0.410)	 (-0.524)	 (-0.105)	 (-0.211)	
	 [-2.260]**	 [-0.640]	 [	1.062]	 [-0.736]	 [	0.199]	 [	0.822]	 [	1.269]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
BRENT(-2)	 0.196	 -0.189	 -0.238	 -0.490	 0.118	 0.055	 0.033	
	 (-0.460)	 (-0.316)	 (-0.363)	 (-0.408)	 (-0.520)	 (-0.108)	 (-0.307)	
	 [	0.424]	 [-0.598]	 [-0.654]	 [-1.200]	 [	0.227]	 [	0.510]	 [	0.106]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
GDP(-1)	 3.232	 18.969	 7.634	 0.913	 0.262	 -7.974	 -5.125	
	 (-4.109)	 (-7.105)	 (-4.525)	 (-2.048)	 (-3.585)	 (-3.025)	 (-3.747)	
	 [	0.786]	 [	2.669]	 [	1.687]	 [	0.446]	 [	0.072]	 [-2.635]	 [-1.367]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
GDP(-2)	 -4.507	 0.320	 6.403	 -1.109	 -0.185	 7.504	 -5.969	
	 (-4.158)	 (-7.028)	 (-4.032)	 (-1.923)	 (-3.214)	 (-4.781)	 (-5.163)	
	 [-1.084]	 [	0.045]	 [	1.587]	 [-0.576]	 [-0.057]	 [	1.569]	 [-1.156]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
SP(-1)	 1.942	 0.051	 -0.459	 0.035	 0.466	 0.259	 0.233	
	 (-0.692)	 (-0.481)	 (-0.508)	 (-0.619)	 (-0.351)	 (-0.263)	 (-0.452)	
	 [	2.807]	 [	0.105]	 [-0.902]	 [	0.056]	 [	1.328]	 [	0.984]	 [	0.515]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
SP(-2)	 -0.811	 -0.250	 -0.463	 0.531	 -0.659	 0.328	 -0.647	
	 (-0.814)	 (-0.434)	 (-0.592)	 (-0.677)	 (-0.732)	 (-0.280)	 (-0.664)	
	 [-0.996]	 [-0.576]	 [-0.782]	 [	0.783]	 [-0.901]	 [	1.172]	 [-0.974]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
C	 0.021	 -0.083	 -0.082	 0.115	 -0.001	 -0.028	 0.149	
	 (-0.038)	 (-0.062)	 (-0.058)	 (-0.075)	 (-0.052)	 (-0.016)	 (-0.100)	
	 [	0.538]	 [-1.349]	 [-1.412]	 [	1.541]	 [-0.026]	 [-1.743]	 [	1.488]	
**Note: () = Standard Error, [] = t-statistic, ** = statistically significant at 5% level 
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D)Sub-group 4: 
	 Canada	 France	 Germany	 Japan	 Norway	 UK	 US	
IR(-1)	 0.171	 0.045	 0.330	 1.967	 0.090	 -0.770	 -0.457	
	 (-0.145)	 (-0.435)	 (-0.342)	 (-7.232)	 (-0.281)	 (-0.300)	 (-0.283)	
	 [	1.181]	 [	0.102]	 [	0.964]	 [	0.272]	 [	0.320]	 [-2.568]	 [-1.617]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
IR(-2)	 0.390	 -0.194	 -0.479	 -0.394	 -0.279	 0.424	 0.649	
	 (-0.195)	 (-0.344)	 (-0.290)	 (-7.635)	 (-0.210)	 (-0.226)	 (-0.302)	
	 [	2.005]	 [-0.564]	 [-1.649]	 [-0.051]	 [-1.328]	 [	1.877]	 [	2.147]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
BRENT(-1)	 0.046	 -0.106	 0.026	 0.007	 -0.233	 -0.181	 -0.021	
	 (-0.111)	 (-0.213)	 (-0.176)	 (-0.229)	 (-0.271)	 (-0.108)	 (-0.068)	
	 [	0.415]	 [-0.495]	 [	0.149]	 [	0.031]	 [-0.860]	 [-1.676]	 [-0.310]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
BRENT(-2)	 0.011	 0.247	 0.247	 0.098	 0.215	 -0.107	 0.328	
	 (-0.117)	 (-0.200)	 (-0.164)	 (-0.234)	 (-0.196)	 (-0.128)	 (-0.074)	
	 [	0.090]	 [	1.234]	 [	1.504]	 [	0.418]	 [	1.096]	 [-0.837]	 [	4.431]**	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
GDP(-1)	 -0.362	 -1.066	 10.499	 8.223	 3.891	 2.209	 2.868	
	 (-3.085)	
(-
13.546)	 (-6.305)	 (-5.149)	 (-3.342)	 (-4.612)	 (-1.214)	
	 [-0.117]	 [-0.078]	 [	1.665]	 [	1.597]	 [	1.164]	 [	0.478]	 [	2.363]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
GDP(-2)	 0.627	 8.835	 4.640	 -0.557	 -1.297	 -1.038	 -1.518	
	 (-3.014)	 (-9.909)	 (-5.342)	 (-4.576)	 (-2.779)	 (-4.966)	 (-0.959)	
	 [	0.208]	 [	0.891]	 [	0.868]	 [-0.121]	 [-0.466]	 [-0.208]	 [-1.583]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
SP(-1)	 -0.085	 0.208	 -0.055	 0.155	 0.308	 -1.131	 -0.210	
	 (-0.365)	 (-0.593)	 (-0.376)	 (-0.576)	 (-0.468)	 (-0.459)	 (-0.199)	
	 [-0.231]	 [	0.350]	 [-0.146]	 [	0.269]	 [	0.658]	 [-2.466]	 [-1.058]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
SP(-2)	 -0.311	 -0.042	 -0.183	 -0.530	 -0.057	 -0.435	 0.110	
	 (-0.269)	 (-0.454)	 (-0.377)	 (-0.504)	 (-0.464)	 (-0.407)	 (-0.298)	
	 [-1.154]	 [-0.093]	 [-0.484]	 [-1.053]	 [-0.122]	 [-1.071]	 [	0.370]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
C	 0.026	 -0.005	 -0.018	 -0.181	 -0.022	 -0.147	 0.029	
	 (-0.027)	 (-0.043)	 (-0.040)	 (-0.190)	 (-0.051)	 (-0.083)	 (-0.017)	
	 [	0.941]	 [-0.110]	 [-0.445]	 [-0.948]	 [-0.439]	 [-1.780]	 [	1.775]	
**Note: () = Standard Error, [] = t-statistic, ** = statistically significant at 5% level 
In the second sub-group (2003, Q1 – 2008, Q3), Canada, Norway, and France all were 
statistically significant, as seen in Table 5. Canada follows the same result as in sub-group one; it 
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has a positive response to an oil price shock yet the confident intervals lay positive and negative 
providing uncertainty in the results. The stock markets in Norway have no response to a one 
standard deviation shock in oil prices, as seen by the impulse response function. This result was 
not expected since oil production represents “22 percent of Norwegian GDP and 67% of 
Norwegian exports”, according to the European commission (European). The French stock 
market showed a negative response to an oil price shock. In the first quarter, stocks fell around 
1.8% and dropped further to around 3.6% in the second quarter before turning insignificant. The 
response by the French market makes sense since it is considered an oil consuming country. 
Within the second sub-group, the price of oil reached its highest peak due to an immense growth 
in the global economy. The growth caused an increase in global demand for oil due to the 
expansionary impacts. Since France is a highly consuming country one would assume that an 
immense increase in oil prices would cause the stock markets to decrease a certain amount.  
 In the third sub-group (2008, Q4 – 2012, Q2) the only country that was statistically 
significant was Canada in the first lag with a t-statistic of -2.26. According to the impulse 
response function, the stock markets responded positively by 6.2% in the first quarter then fell to 
around 4.2% in the second quarter and becomes insignificant right after quarter two. In the fourth 
sub-group (2012, Q3 – 2016, Q1) only the United States was statically significant and had a t-
statistic of 4.43 in the second lag. Although the oil price shock on stock returns in the United 
States was statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval, in the second lag the impulse 
response shows no effect on the stock market.  
 These results show the necessity to segregate the data in order to take into account 
structural changes. The full sample compared to the sub-groups represented mixed results yet 
mainly showed no relationship between oil price shocks and the stock market. The results of this 
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paper are similar to Le and Chang (2015) findings. Le and Chang (2015) found no causality 
between oil price shocks and the stock market at the 5 percent significance level. They also 
found that, when segregated, the significance level changes within some sub-groups, particularly 
between the periods of 2003-2008 and 2008-2013.  Additionally, this paper found that the UK 
Brent crude oil best represents shocks for the countries included in this paper.  
Figure 2: Statistically Significant IRF for sub-groups  
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B) Sub-group 2:  
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C) Sub-group 3:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D) Sub-group 4:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.6 Conclusion of Results Section: 
 
 This paper took two approaches in order to answer the question of whether oil price 
shocks had any effects on stock returns in developed countries. First, it was necessary to separate 
the sample into oil consuming and producing countries to see if the nature of the economy had 
any effect on the response of stock markets to a shock. Once this was completed, the first 
approach was to answer this question by analyzing the entire sample. After a vector 
Canada:		
US:		
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autoregressive model was run, the results illustrated statically insignificant effects of oil price 
shocks on the stock market at 95% confidence interval for both oil consuming and producing 
economies. These results indicate that at a macro level, stock markets are able to immediately 
incorporate information on the result of an oil price shock and integrate it proficiently and 
quickly into the stock prices thus having no considerable effects. These results align with Le and 
Change (2015) who found no relationship between oil price shocks and stock returns at the 5% 
significance level when looking at the full sample.  
 After finding no effect at the macro level when looking at the full sample, I segregated 
the data and looked at it at a micro level to adjust for possible structural changes within the data. 
Once the sample was divided into four sub-groups, I found some statistically significant results. 
Although there are countries in each sub-group that are statistically significant, only two 
countries – Canada and France - show a relationship between oil shocks and stock returns 
through the impulse response functions. France’s stock market showed a negative response to an 
oil price shock by 1.8% in the first quarter and 3.6% in the second quarter in the second sub-
group (2003, Q1 to 2008, Q3). This result makes sense since France is an oil-consuming 
country—when oil prices peaked, the stock market was negatively hit. Canada’s stock market in 
the third sub-group had a positive response to an oil price shock by 6.2% in the first quarter that 
decreased to 4.2% in the second quarter before becoming insignificant. This relationship was 
expected since Canada is an oil producing country. In all other cases for each country, according 
to the impulse response function, there is no relationship present. Overall, these results show the 
necessity to segregate the data in order to account for changes throughout time; looking only at 
the full sample could provide misleading results.  
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Chapter Five 
V. Conclusion:  
 
 This paper examined the relationship between oil price shocks on stock returns in 
developed countries, specifically the G7 countries and Norway. The sample period examined 
ranged from the first quarter in 1994 to the first quarter in 2016. The empirical method used was 
an unstructured reduced form vector autoregressive (VAR) model including the following 
variables: oil price (APSP and UK Brent oil crude index), interest rates, gross domestic product 
(GDP), and stock returns per country. The VAR model allows us to run impulse response 
functions from its estimated outputs in order to see how stock returns react to a one standard 
deviation shock in oil prices. Additionally, I distinguish between oil producing and oil 
consuming economies within the sample of countries examined in order to see whether the 
effects are different. This method aligns with Ramos and Veiga (2013) and Jammaz (2015) who 
proposed that there are asymmetric effects of oil price shocks on stock returns depending on the 
nature of the economy – whether it is mainly an oil exporter or importer.  
 In order to determine which countries were oil producers and which oil consumer we 
looked at the production and consumption of oil within each country. By looking at the ratio of 
oil production to consumption, we were able to clearly label the nature of each economy in 
regards to its reliance on oil. Through this process it was determined that France, Japan, and 
Germany were all oil-consuming countries with a ratio oil production to consumption of less 
than 0.03 percent. Among these countries, Japan is the most reliant on the consumption of oil. 
Norway, Canada, United Kingdom, and the United States are all considered oil producers. 
Among these countries, Norway is the largest oil producer to consumption.   
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The main results of this paper are following. First, when looking at the full sample there 
is no relationship between oil price shocks and stock returns in both oil consuming and 
producing economies. This result differs from what I assumed for Norway yet aligns with my 
assumptions of the United States. It was assumed that Norway would have the most significant 
effect since it on average produces seven times more than it consumes. The United States is both 
a massive oil producer as it is consumer therefore, it was assumed that there would be no effects 
of an oil price shocks due to its diversification. These results align with Le and Chang (2015) and 
suggest that stock markets are efficiently able to incorporate the results of a shock immediately 
into the valuation of stock prices.  
Second, since there was no relationship found when we examined the full sample this 
paper segregated the data into four sub-groups to account for changes within the data. The idea 
of separating the data in order to account for geo-political and structural changes within the 
sample was used in previous literature by Diaz and Moero (2016) and Le and Change (2015). 
These results show that for the majority of the countries in all sub-groups there still exists no 
relationship between oil price shocks and stock returns.  
There was a relationship between oil shocks and stock returns in two cases – France and 
Canada. France experienced an immediate negative effect of 1.8% on stock returns in the first 
quarter and reaches a maximum negative impact of 3.8% in the second quarter between the 
period of 2003, Q1 to 2008, Q3. This negative impact makes sense since during this time period 
the price of oil peaked thus an economy in which relies on the importation of oil will be hit 
negatively. Canada’s stock market was positively impacted by 6.2% in the first quarter and 4.2% 
in the second quarter during the period of 2008, Q3 to 2012, Q2. These results are backed by the 
findings in previous literature, which found that a shock in oil prices had asymmetric effects 
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depending on whether a country is an oil importer or exporter. Overall, the results suggest few 
effects of oil shocks on stock returns. Additionally the results suggest the necessity to separate 
the data, as the whole sample may present misleading results.  
Limitations of this study and further improvements are as following. In order to increase 
the accuracy of the data, monthly observations should be used instead of quarterly. The smaller 
the frequency of observations will capture a greater extent of the relationship between the 
variables. This paper was unable to use monthly data since GDP is not available in monthly 
terms. Previous research had used industrial production data instead of GDP as a measure of 
economic activity, which is in monthly terms. Additionally, a larger sample period will allow a 
more in depth analysis of how the dynamics of oil price shocks on stock returns changed 
throughout time. This paper was unable to attain monthly data and have a larger sample period 
due to the costs associated with attaining the information. Moreover, due to the limitations of my 
econometric knowledge there could be more sophisticated models used to answer the research 
question. For example, Jammazi (2015) and Bacliar and Gupta (2015) both use models in which 
takes into account structural changes within the model. Jammazi uses a two-regime MS-
EGARCH model and Bacliar and Gupta uses a Markov switching vector autoregressive (MC-
VAR) and Markov switching vector error-correction (MS-VEC) model, which is an updated 
version of a VAR.  
In light of these results, further research is needed. Further research can look at whether 
the volatility of oil prices affects stock returns in countries specified in this paper, additionally 
whether there are different affects depending on the nature of the economy – oil producing 
versus consuming economies. Furthermore, the analysis of looking at how oil price shocks or oil 
price volatility affected stock returns can be done on a micro or industry level.  
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Appendix B Regressions:  
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B) Sub-Group 1:  
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C) Sub-group 2:  
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D) Sub-group 3:  
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E) Sub-group 4:  
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Appendix C Unit Root Tests:  
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